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Petty Offenses, Serious Consequences: Multiple Petty 
Offenses and the Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Trial 
Jeff E. Butler 
We cannot exclude recognition of a scale of moral values according to 
which some offenses are heinous and some are not. ... To the discrim-
inating judgment there is also a difference between a maximum of ten 
days in jail and the risk of five years' imprisonment. What about 
three months? What about six months? Here we reach the everlast-
ing enigma in law and in life: When is far too far?l 
Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to jury 
trial for all criminal defendants? the Supreme Court long has held 
that certain criminal offenses are not serious enough to trigger this 
right.3 Since petty4 offenses such as traffic violations and small-time 
misdemeanors are not worth the public expense of empaneling a 
jury, the Court has held that these offenses may be tried before a 
judge without violating the Sixth Amendment. The existence of 
this "petty-offense exception" to the right to jury trial never has 
been seriously challenged,5 but the scope of the exception repeat-
edly has been the subject of judicial scrutiny. 
1. Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional 
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HAR.v. L. REv. 917, 981 (1926). 
2. See U.S. CaNST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed .... "). 
The right to jury trial is guaranteed in Article III as well as the Sixth Amendment. See 
U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall 
be by Jury .... "). The scope of the Article III guarantee, however, is considered identical to 
that of the Sixth Amendment. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 971; George 
Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers/, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 245, 260 (1959). Although the 
arguments herein apply to both guarantees, this Note refers only to the Sixth Amendment. 
3. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) ("So-called petty offenses were tried 
without juries both in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt 
from the otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provi-
sions."); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552 (1888) ("(W]hen it is declared that the party is 
entitled to a speedy trial by an impartial jury • • . [i]t could never have been intended to 
embrace every species of accusation involving either criminal or penal consequences."); see 
also Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 979 ("The Supreme Court, therefore, has given 
emphatic recognition to the common-law and colonial exemption of 'petty offenses' from the 
constitutional requirement of jury trial. The implication of exemption is itself part of the 
Constitution."). But see Kaye, supra note 2, at 273 (arguing that the petty-offense exception 
cannot be squared with the plain language of the Constitution). ' 
4. The words petty and serious are used as Sixth Amendment terms of art throughout this 
Note. When these words are used to express their ordinary meaning, they will appea~; in 
quotation marks. · 
5. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158 ("(W]e hold no constitutional doubts about the practic~s 
... of accepting waivers of jury trial and prosecuting petty crimes without extending a ri~t to 
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In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas,6 the Supreme Court set 
forth the definitive standard for distinguishing petty offenses from 
serious crimes.7 The benchmark used by the Court is the maximum 
prison term assigned to each offense by the legislature. Where the 
penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment, the offense is serious 
enough to trigger the right to jury trial. Where the penalty is six 
months' imprisonment or less, there is a strong presumption that 
the offense is petty; therefore, a defendant accused of that offense 
has no Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. 
The Blanton decision, however, provides little guidance in a case 
where multiple offenses, each of which otherwise would be consid-
ered petty, are joined together in a single trial. In such a case, no 
individual offense would have a statutory penalty of more than six 
months' imprisonment, but a conviction on all charges could expose 
the defendant to a lengthy prison term without the opportunity to 
invoke the procedural safeguards of a jury trial. 8 Lower courts 
have responded to the problem of applying the Blanton standard to 
multiple petty offenses in three different ways. Some courts apply 
the standard to each offense individually, regardless of whether 
other offenses are joined on the same charging instrument.9 Others 
add up the possible penalties for all joined offenses and assume that 
the right to jury trial exists whenever the six-month limit is ex-
ceeded by the aggregate potential penalty.lo Still others refuse re-
quests for jury trial unless the sentence imposed for all offenses in 
fact will exceed six months' imprisonment.11 
jury trial."); United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512,1515 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is not our 
function to even question the validity of the petty-offense exception."). Indeed, the judiciary 
probably could not function without the petty-offense exception: 
For example, 83,092 petty offenses, 56,763 of which were traffic offenses, were disposed 
of by United States Magistrates in 1987. The federal judiciary, as it is presently consti-
tuted, cannot conduct over 83,000 jury trials in one year for this one class of cases in 
addition to the jury trials that are required for serious criminal cases and civil cases. 
926 F.2d at 1515 (citation omitted). 
6. 489 u.s. 538 (1989). 
'_1. The standard more appropriately would be called the Baldwin-Blanton standard. In 
United States v. Baldwin, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the Court held for the first time that a statutory 
offense having a maximum penalty exceeding six months' imprisonment automatically trig-
gers the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. This case left open the question of whether an 
offense with a maximum penalty of less than six months can trigger the Sixth Amendment 
Blm:zton considered that issue and held that such offenses are presumed petty. For the sake 
of brevity, this Note refers to the six-month standard that is central to both of these cases as 
tlie' Blanton standard. 
. 8,. This Note assumes that the right to jury trial always favors defendants who, of course, 
:.ritay waive the right whenever it appears advantageous to do so. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158 
("['i']he fact is that in most places more trials for serious crimes are to juries than to a court 
alone; a great many defendan~ prefer the judgment of a jury to that of a court."). 
, : 9:. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 1995) . . . 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991). 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
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This Note argues that a criminal defendant accused of multiple 
offenses has no Sixth Amendment right to jury trial unless one or 
more of the offenses - considered individually - is serious under 
the Blanton standard. Part I explores one principal that pervades 
the Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the petty-offense ex-
ception: community preferences determine whether a criminal 
charge is petty or serious; The Court measures community prefer-
ences by looking to the maximum penalty set by the legislature; if 
no statutory penalty exists, then the Court uses the sentence im-
posed by the judge as a substitute. Part II argues that, for multiple 
petty offenses, the Blanton standard should be applied to each of-
fense individually because this is the only approach consistent with 
the Court's petty-offense-exception jurisprudence. Therefore, this 
Note concludes that multiple petty offenses do not trigger the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial. 
I. WHAT MAKES A PETTY OFFENSE PETTY? 
The Supreme Court has offered several principles for distin-
guishing petty offenses from serious crimes. At first inspection, 
these principles may seem contradictory. This Part argues, how-
ever, that careful examination of the Court's decisions reveals a hi-
erarchy among them. Section I.A explores the fundamental 
principle that community preferences determine whether an offense 
is petty or serious and argues that the consequences for a particular 
defendant should not determine whether an offense is petty or seri-
ous. Section I.B asserts that the maximum penalty set by the legis-
lature for criminal offenses is the best indicator of community 
preferences. Section I.C argues that, absent a maximum penalty set 
by the legislature, the sentence imposed by the judge is the second-
best indicator of community preferences. 
A. Community Preferences 
The principle that community preferences12 determine whether 
a criminal charge is petty or serious recurs throughout the Supreme 
12. The phrase "community preferences" is a composite of various phrases employed by 
the courts and commentators to denote the public's perception of the "seriousness" of an 
offense. In Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969), the Supreme Court used the 
phrase "the seriousness with which society regards the offense" to express this concept. This 
language has been quoted in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See Blanton v. City of 
North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538,541 {1989); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 {1970). This 
Note uses "community preferences" to avoid any confusion resulting from the use of the 
term serious to express both society's judgment concerning an offense and the constitutional 
status of that offense. 
The most complete definition of "community preferences" is suggested by Frankfurter 
and Corcoran in the following passage: 
In subjecting certain conduct to the summary procedure of magistrates, unguarded by ' 
the popular element, there was an exercise of moral judgment dividing behavior into· 
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Court's petty-offense-exception jurisprudence. Th~ Court first rec-
ognized the connection between community preferences and the 
petty-offense exception in District of Columbia v. Clawans.13 Since 
that decision, the Court frequently has reiterated the need to link 
the application of the petty-offense exception to community 
preferences.14 
This principle follows directly from the need for efficient alloca-
tion of the right to jury trial. The petty-offense exception exists be-
cause this right is too expensive for the public to finance in every 
criminal prosecution. Efficient allocation of this scarce resource de-
mands that the right to jury trial be reserved tor defendants accused 
of crimes "serious" enough to merit expensive procedural safe-
guards.15 Because the public bears the cost of conducting jury tri-
als, the public also should decide where to draw the line between 
petty and serious crimes. 
The principle that community preferences determine whether a 
criminal offense is petty or serious has an important corollary: con-
sequences for individual defendants should not determine whether 
charges trigger the right to jury trial. Deference to community pref-
erences follows logically from the need for efficiency in allocating 
the scarce right to jury trial. No such justification exists for condi-
serious affairs and minor misdeeds .... Broadly speaking, acts were dealt with summarily 
which did not offend too deeply the moral purposes of the community, which were not 
too close to society's danger, and were stigmatized by punishment relatively light. 
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 980-81. For other formulations of this concept, see 
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) (referring to the "community['s] ... 
social and ethical judgments"); Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1549 (lOth Cir. 1983) (re-
ferring to "the opprobrium that society attaches to the crime charged"); United States v. 
Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (referring to "the general normative judgment of the 
seriousness of an offense"). 
13. 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) ("Doubts must be resolved ... by objective standards such as 
may be observed in the laws and practices of the community taken as a gauge of its social and 
ethical judgments." (emphasis added)). Implicit recognition of this principle dates back fur-
ther still. Earlier Supreme Court cases decided whether an offense was petty or serious by 
looking to common law practices. But the common law status of an offense depended on 
whether summary disposition had been authorized by the British Parliament for that offense. 
See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 932-33. Thus, community preferences concern-
ing an offense were incorporated directly - via Parliament - into the common law status of 
the offense as petty or serious. 
14. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 ("In recent years, however, we have sought more 'objec-
tive indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense.' " (emphasis added)); 
~aldwin, 399 U.S. at 68 ("In deciding whether an offense is 'petty,' we have sought objective 
criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society regards the offense •. •• "(emphasis ad-
aed)); Frank, 395 U.S. at 148 ("In determining whether a particular offense can be classified 
as .'petty,' this Court has sought objective indications of the seriousness with which society 
regards the offense." (emphasis added)); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.145, 160 (1968) ("The 
penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken 'as a gauge of its social and ethical 
jUdgments' of the crime in question." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
, ,15. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 ("[T]he possible consequences to defendants from con-
victions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to efficient 
law enforcement and simplified judicial administration resulting from the availability of 
sp,e~dy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications."). 
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tioning this right on the consequences facing individual defendants. 
A "serious" consequence to one defendant may be a trivial imposi-
tion on another.16 Therefore, if the seriousness of an offense or set 
of offenses is determined according to how "serious" individual de-
fendants view a potential sentence, the right to jury trial will be 
allocated haphazardly - wasted on some defendants and denied 
unjustly to others. 
The Supreme Court has endorsed this corollary almost as fre-
quently as it has endorsed the principle itself. In Clawans, the 
Court stated that the sympathy of a judge for a particular defendant 
should carry no weight in deciding whether to allocate the right to 
jury trialP In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 1B the Court stated specifi-
cally that the threat of a lengthy prison sentence alone is not suffi-
cient to trigger the right to jury trial. In both Blanton v. City of 
North Las Vegas and Baldwin v. New York, the Court recognized 
that a defendant sentenced to six months' imprisonment is unlikely 
to view this sentence as a "petty" consequence but nevertheless en-
dorsed the rule that a six-month sentence does not trigger the right 
to jury trial.19 Indeed, the strict six-month rule in Blanton itself 
contradicts any notion that consequences to the defendant should 
be weighed in deciding whether an offense is petty or serious. 
This corollary also finds support in the history of the petty-
offense exception. The exception evolved from the practice in Eng-
land and the American colonies of denying the right to jury trial for 
certain offenses recognized as "petty" by the legislature.2o When 
16. The converse is also true. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 73 ("Indeed, the prospect of im-
prisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 
'petty' matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his 
reputation."). 
17. See C/awans, 300 U.S. at 628 ("Doubts must be resolved, not subjectively by recourse 
of the judge to his own sympathy and emotions, but by objective standards .... "). 
18. 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) ("[W]e plainly cannot accept petitioners' argument that a 
[defendant] is entitled to a jury trial simply because a strong possibility exists that he will face 
a substantial term of imprisonment upon conviction, regardless of the penalty actually 
imposed."). 
19. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1989); Baldwin, 399 
U.S. at 73. · 
20. In their classic defense of the petty-offense exception, Frankfurter and Corcoran de-
scribe the practice in England at the time of American colonization as follows: 
Thus drastically limited does the right of trial by jury seem to have been known to En-
glishmen for two centuries preceding the separation of the colonies. Alongside of trial 
before the popular tribunal was trial by magistrates. There were crimes and crimes. The 
great dividing line was the use of a jury. The settled practice in which the founders of 
the American colonies grew up reserved for the justices innumerable cases in which the · 
balance of social convenience, as expressed in legislation, insisted that proceedings be · 
concluded speedily and inexpensively. 
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 933. Although restricting its use in various ways, 
the American colonies retained the English custom of nonjury adjudication. See id. at 936 
("Despite these differences, all the colonies, to some extent at least, re-lived the experience 
of the mother country, and resorted to summary jurisdiction for minor offenses with ·full 
loyalty to their conception of the Englishman's right to trial by jury."). 
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the Constitution was adopted, courts assumed that these common 
law exceptions were incorporated into the Sixth Amendment.21 
The application of these exceptions depended entirely on statutory 
dictates and common law precedent, not on the consequences fac-
ing a particular defendant. Indeed, many of the offenses considered 
"petty" at common law carried penalties that would be considered 
"serious" by today's standards.zz 
B. The Maximum Statutory Penalty 
The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that the best 
measure of community preferences concerning a criminal offense is 
the maximum penalty23 set by the legislature.24 The assumptions 
21. See id. at 969 ("The exclusion of [the] 'petty offense' had been, as we have seen, the 
accepted doctrine of the colonies and thereafter in the states . . . . The makers of the Consti-
tution took all this history and practice for granted."). 
22. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 626 {1937) ("[T]here were petty 
offenses, triable summarily under English statutes, which carried possible sentences of im-
prisonment for periods from three to twelve months."); see also Frankfurter & Corcoran, 
supra note 1, at 932-33 (listing petty offenses from English common law, some of which carry 
penalties of corporal punishment or imprisonment for up to one year). 
23. The penalty authorized by the legislature includes not only the authorized prison term 
but also any other penalty authorized by the legislature, such as a fine or probation. In 
Blanton, Melvin Blanton was charged with drunk driving which, under Nevada law, carried a 
maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment, a maximum $1,000 fine, a mandatory penalty 
of attendance at an alcohol-abuse education course, and an automatic 90-day driver's license 
suspension. See 489 U.S. at 539-40. The Court first concluded that the maximum period of 
incarceration was insufficient to trigger a right to jury trial. See 489 U.S. at 543. The Court 
next considered whether any of the other penalties implied that the community viewed drunk 
driving as a serious offense. 
A defendant is entitled to a jury trial in such circumstances only if he can demonstrate 
that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum author-
ized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determi-
nation that the offense in question is a "serious" one. This standard, albeit somewhat 
imprecise, should ensure the availability of a jury trial in the rare situation where a 
legislature packs an offense it deems "serious" with onerous penalties that nonetheless 
"do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line." 
489 U.S. at 543 (quoting Brief for Petitioners). The Court concluded that none of the addi-
tional penalties rendered the offense serious and that no constitutional right to trial by jury 
therefore existed. See 489 U.S. at 543-44. 
Since the decision in Blanton, few penalties other than the maximum prison term have 
been held sufficiently serious to trigger the right to jury trial. Compare United States v. 
Nachtigal, 113 S. Ct. 1072 (1993) {holding that a $5,000 fine and alternative of 5 years' proba-
tion did not render an offense serious) with Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 
1990) (holding that a 15-year driver's license suspension rendered an offense serious) and 
State v. Wiltshire, 491 N.W.2d 324 (Neb. 1992) (same). 
24. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) ("[T]he judgment about the 
seriousness of the crime is normally heavily influenced by the penalty authorized by the legis-
lature ••.• "); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) ("In deciding whether an offense 
is 'petty,' we have sought objective criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society re-
gards the offense, and we have found the most relevant such criteria in the severity of the 
maximum authorized penalty." (citations omitted)); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 
(1969) {"In ordinary criminal prosecutions, the severity of the penalty authorized, not the 
penalty actually imposed, is the relevant criterion."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 
(1968) ("[T]he penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major relevance in determining 
whether it is serious or not •.. . ");see also Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 (quoting Baldwin). 
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underlying this rule are that the legislature is in the best position to 
gauge societal preferences25 and that the legislature fixes the maxi-
mum penalty for an offense based on how "serious" society regards 
the offense.26 The maximum statutory penalty, therefore, is rele-
vant to the allocation of the right to jury trial because there is a 
logical relationship between the statutory penalty and community 
preferences.27 
The practice of looking to the maximum statutory penalty to 
determine whether this right attaches is a relatively recent innova-
tion. Early Supreme Court cases followed the haphazard approach 
of distinguishing between petty and serious offenses by reference to 
English common law.28 Subsequent decisions modified this ap-
25. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42 ("The judiciary should not substitute its judgment as 
to seriousness for that of a legislature, which is 'far better equipped to perform the task, and 
[is] likewise more responsive to changes in attitude and more amenable to the recognition 
and correction of their misperceptions in this respect.'" (alteration in original) (quoting 
Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1209 (5th Cir. 1988))). 
26. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 ("In fixing the maximum penalty for a crime, a legisla-
ture 'include[s] within the definition of the crime itself a judgment about the seriousness of 
the offense.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Frank, 395 U.S. at 149)); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 
162 n.35 ("[A] legislative judgment as to the seriousness of the crime is imbedded in the 
statute in the form of an express authorization to impose a heavy penalty for the crime in 
question.''); see also United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) ("An offense is 
not 'serious' because it is severely punished; it is severely punished because it is 'serious.' "). 
27. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390-91 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
("The relevance of the sentence, as we have seen, is that it sheds light on the seriousness with 
which the community and the legislature regard the offense."); United States v. Coppins, 953 
F2d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he most relevant objective indicator is now recognized as 
being the severity of any maximum penalty that may have been legislatively authorized, re-
flecting as that does a legislative, hence societal, judgment about the seriousness of the of-
fense."); see also Frank, 395 U.S. at 157-59 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that probation 
statute penalties should not be used to determine whether offenses are petty because Con-
gress did not intend that these penalties apply to any particular offense). 
28. In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888), the Supreme Court first recognized that the 
petty-offense exception evolved out of common law practices. Justice Harlan wrote: 
The third article of the Constitution provides for a jury in the trial of 'all crimes, except 
in cases of impeachment.' The word 'crime,' in its more extended sense, comprehends 
every violation of public law; in a limited sense, it embraces offenses of a serious or 
atrocious character. In our opinion, the provision is to be interpreted in the light of the 
principles which, at common law, determined whether the accused, in a given class of 
cases, was entitled to be tried by a jury. 
127 U.S. at 549. Taking as its premise that the petty-offense exception evolved from a prac-
tice predating the Constitution, the Court concluded that only those offenses exempted from 
trial by jury at common law could be called petty. All other offenses triggered the right to 
jury trial. Justice Harlan wrote, 
Except in that class or grade of offences called petty offences, which, according to the 
common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for 
that purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prosecution, 
conducted either in the name, or by or under the authority of, the United States, secures 
to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first moment, and in whatever court, 
he is put on trial for the offence charged. 
127 U.S. at 557. Following this decision, courts determined whether a defendant could assert 
a constitutional right to jury trial by researching common law practices. If the offense could 
be tried summarily at common law, no constitutional right to jury trial existed. If the com-
mon law offense required trial by jury, then that right was guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
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proach to avoid dependence on murky common law precedents. In 
District of Columbia v. Clawans,29 the Court held that the severity 
of the potential penalty could transform an offense considered petty 
at common law into a serious offense.30 Thus, the Court departed 
from mechanical adherence to common law precedent in determin-
ing whether an offense was petty or serious. 
More recent Supreme Court decisions have abandoned entirely 
the use of common law precedent to distinguish between petty and 
serious offenses. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 31 the Court concluded 
that the maximum statutory penalty alone may indicate that an of-
fense is serious, thus triggering the right to jury trial. Justice White 
wrote, "the penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major 
relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and may in 
itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth 
Am.endment."32 Subsequent decisions interpreting the petty-
offense exception cite Duncan for the proposition that the maxi-
mum penalty set by the legislature should play a primary role in 
deciding whether an offense is petty or serious.33 
C. The Sentence Imposed 
The rule that the maximum penalty set by the legislature is the 
best indicator of community preferences cannot apply in cases 
where no maximum statutory penalty exists for an offense. For ex-
ample, in many jurisdictions criminal contempt has no maximum 
statutory penalty.34 To deal with this problem, the Supreme Court 
ment. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (holding that reckless 
driving triggered the right to jury trial because "[i]t was an indictable offense at common 
law"). 
29. 300 u.s. 617 (1937). 
30. See 300 U.S. at 625 ("[T]his Court has refused to foreclose consideration of the sever-
ity of the penalty as an element to be considered in determining whether a statutory offense, 
in other respects trivial and not a crime at common law, must be deemed so serious as to be 
comparable with common law crimes, and thus to entitle the accused to the benefit of a jury 
trial prescribed by the Constitution."). 
31. 391 u.s. 145 (1968). 
32. 391 U.S. at 159. 
33. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989); Baldwin v. New 
York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970). 
34. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162 n.35 ("[C]riminal contempt is unique in that legislative 
bodies frequently authorize punishment without stating the extent of the penalty which can 
be imposed."); see also Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 & n.1 (1969) (noting the 
various federal criminal contempt provisions); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 206 n.8 (1968) 
(describing state criminal contempt provisions). 
Criminal contempts always have been treated as a unique class of offenses under the Sixth 
Amendment. Early Supreme Court cases denied the right to trial by jury to those accused of 
criminal contempt, regardless of the punishment; involved. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 
165 (1958), summarizes the logic of these early eases. The Supreme Court noted that when 
the Constitution was created it had been common practice in England and colonial America 
to try contempt charges summarily, see 356 U.S. at 184-86, and then stated: 
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stated an alternative rule for criminal contempts in Bloom v. 
Illinois. 35 In cases where no maximum statutory penalty exists for a 
criminal offense, the sentence imposed by the judge is the best indi-
cator of community preferences regarding the offense.36 
The principle that criminal contempts of court are not required to be tried by a jury 
under Article III or the Sixth Amendment is firmly rooted in our traditions. . •• In 
various respects, such as the absence of a statutory limitation of the amount of a fine or 
the length of a prison sentence which may be imposed for their commission, criminal 
contempts have always differed from the usual statutory crime under federal law. As to 
trial by jury and indictment by grand jury, they possess a unique character under the 
Constitution. 
356 U.S. at 187. 
A few years after Green, the Supreme Court began to waver in its conviction that the 
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial did not apply to criminal contemners. In United States 
v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964), the Court declined to create a general right to jury trial for 
those accused of criminal contempt but hinted in a footnote that the Constitution might bar 
courts from imposing substantial penalties for criminal contempt without affording defend-
ants the right to trial by jury. See 376 U.S. at 695 n.12 ("Some members of the Court are of 
the view that, without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment by summary trial 
without a jury would be constitutionally limited to that penalty provided for petty offenses."). 
In Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), the Court again declined to extend a 
constitutional right to jury trial to all criminal contemners. But, in the exercise of its supervi-
sory power, the Court barred federal courts from imposing sentences of more than six 
months' imprisonment for criminal contemners unless they had been afforded the opportu-
nity for a jury trial. See 384 U.S. at 380. 
In 1968, the Supreme Court finally abolished the per se rule that criminal contemnors 
have no right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 
(1968). 
[W]e are acutely aware of the responsibility we assume in entertaining challenges to a 
constitutional principle which is firmly entrenched and which has behind it weighty and 
ancient authority. Our deliberations have convinced us, however, that serious con-
tempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are subject to the jury trial provi-
sions of the Constitution, now binding on the States, and that the tradittonal rule is 
constitutionally infirm insofar as it permits other than petty contempts to be tried with-
out honoring a demand for a jury trial. 
391 U.S. at 197-98. 
35. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). The rule in Bloom is not, strictly speaking, a rule for criminal 
contempts. Criminal contempts that have been assigned a statutory penalty by a legislature 
are not evaluated by the sentence imposed but by the maximum penalty. See infra text ac-
companying notes 40-43 (discussing Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 
(1968)). 
36. See Bloom, 391 U.S. at 211 ("[W]hen the legislature has not expressed a judgment as 
to the seriousness of an offense by fixing a maximum penalty which may be imposed, we are 
to look to the penalty actually imposed as the best evidence of the seriousness of the 
offense."). 
This rule is counterintuitive. How can the right to jury trial, which must be allocated at 
the outset of trial, depend on the sentence eventually imposed, which is not known until the 
end of trial? The answer is that the rule functions by imposing limits on sentencing discre-
tion. If a judge denies a motion for jury trial, then the sentence imposed cannot exceed six 
months' imprisonment. If, after hearing the evidence, the judge wishes to sentence the de-
fendant to more than six months, then the judge must grant a new trial or else the sentence 
will be reduced on appeal. The Court made the practical impact of this rule clear in Taylor v. 
Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). Justice White wrote: 
It is argued that a State should not be permitted, after conviction, to reduce the sentence 
to less than six months and thereby obviate a jury trial. The thrust of our decisions, 
however, is to the contrary: in the absence of legislative authorization of serious penal-
ties for contempt, a State may choose to try any contempt without a jury if it determines 
not to impose a sentence longer than six months. We discern no material difference 
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A cursory reading of the Bloom decision suggests that the Court 
based its decision on the consequences facing the defendant, rather 
than community preferences. The sentence imposed, after all, is the 
consequence facing the defendant. The Bloom rule, however, did 
not result from sympathy for defendants facing a sentence of more 
than six months' imprisonment.37 The sentence imposed is relevant 
to the right to jury trial because it represents the judge's estimation 
of community preferences regarding a particular offense.3s There-
fore, the rule that, under some circumstances, the sentence imposed 
may determine the right to jury trial is not an exception to the prin-
ciple that community preferences determine whether a criminal of-
fense is petty or serious. 
The rule in Bloom also is not an exception to the rule in Duncan 
that the maximum statutory penalty set by the legislature is the best 
indication of community preferences. The two rules simply apply to 
different fact situations.39 The statutory penalty controls the right 
to jury trial whenever a maximum statutory penalty exists for a 
charged offense. In the absence of such, the sentence imposed con-
trols. In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co., 40 the Court 
stated the hierarchical relationship between these two rules in clear 
terms. The petitioner, Wayne Dyke, was convicted of criminal con-
tempt which, pursuant to a Tennessee statute, carried a maximum 
penalty of ten days' imprisonment. Not surprisingly- given the 
short sentence involved - the Court held that Mr. Dyke had no 
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. The Court stated that the ba-
sis for this outcome was the statutory penalty, not the sentence im-
posed. Justice White wrote, 
Alleged criminal contemnors must be given a jury trial, therefore, un-
less the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty within the 
"petty offense" limit or, if the "legislature has made no judgment about 
between this choice and permitting the State, after conviction, to reduce a sentence to 
six months or less rather than to retry the contempt with a jury. 
418 U.S. at 496. The important point to understand is that, by this circuitous route, the right 
to jury trial is allocated only to those defendants who, in the eyes of the judge, have commit-
ted offenses worthy of a "serious" penalty. 
37. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) ("[W]e plainly cannot accept 
petitioners' argument that a contemnor is entitled to a jury trial simply because a strong 
possibility exists that he will face a substantial term of imprisonment upon conviction, regard-
less of the punishment actually imposed."). 
· 38. See Frank, 395 U.S. at 149 ("[T]his court has held that in prosecutions for criminal 
contempt where no maximum penalty is authorized, the severity of the penalty actually im-
posed in the best indication of the seriousness of the particular offense."). 
)9. In fact, the decisions in Bloom and Duncan were both handed down on May 20, 1968, 
and both majority opinions were authored by Justice White. The decisions are printed con-
secutively in the official reporter. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Bloom, 391 
u.~:. at 194. · 
40. 391 u.s. 216 (1968). 
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the maximum penalty that can be imposed, unless the penalty actually 
imposed is within that limit.41 
Under this formula, the Duncan rule for offenses with a maximum 
statutory penalty takes precedence over the Bloom rule for offenses 
without a maximum.42 Therefore, in most circumstances, the maxi-
mum statutory penalty controls the Sixth Amendment right to jury 
trial. 
The same conclusion regarding the hierarchy between the statu-
tory penalty and the sentence imposed can be inferred by the 
Supreme Court's repeated statement that objective criteria of com-
munity preferences are preferable to subjective criteria.43 Statutory 
penalties are more objective because they are based on the experi-
ence of numerous legislators, presumably elected precisely because 
they are in touch with the preferences of society.44 Sentences im-
posed are more subjective because they normally are based on an 
individual judge's discretion. 
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO MULTIPLE PETIY OFFENSES 
The Supreme Court's use of two different rules for measuring 
community preferences has been a source of confusion for lower 
courts trying to apply the petty-offense exception to multiple petty 
offenses. Further complicating matters, lower courts sometimes ap-
ply these rules mechanically, losing sight of the overarching princi-
ple that community preferences must determine whether an offense 
- or set of offenses - is petty or serious. This Part explores the 
disagreement among lower courts concerning application of these 
rules to situations where multiple petty offenses are joined for trial. 
Courts have adopted three different methods for determining 
whether multiple petty offenses trigger the Sixth Amendment right 
to jury trial. The methods are similar in that they each incorporate 
the six-month standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas. The methods disagree, how-
41. 391 U.S. at 219-20. 
42. See also Frank, 395 U.S. at 149 & n.2 (qualifying the rule that, for criminal contempts, 
the sentence imposed is the best indication of community preferences by stating, "[i]f the 
statute creating the offense specifies a maximum penalty, then of course that penalty is the 
relevant criterion"); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162 n.35 (arguing that the sentence imposed is irrel-
evant "where a legislative judgment as to the seriousness of the crime is imbedded in the 
statute in the form of an express authorization to impose a heavy penalty for the crime in 
question"). , 
43. See United States v. Nachtigal, 113 S. Ct. 1072, 1073 (1993); Blanton v. City of North 
Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Frank, 395 
U.S. at 148; District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) ("Doubts must be 
resolved, not subjectively by recourse of the judge to his own sympathy and emotions, but by 
objective standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the comniunity 
taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments."). 
44. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42. 
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ever, concerning how penalties associated with a set of offenses 
should be evaluated under the six-month standard. 
First, some courts argue that the maximum penalty for each of-
fense charged should be compared individually to the six-month 
standard, regardless of whether the offense is joined with other of-
fenses.45 This approach is called the "Individual Penalty Ap-
proach."46 The Second Circuit adopted this approach in United 
States v. Lewis. 41 Ray Lewis was charged with two counts of ob-
structing the mail, an offense punishable by six months' imprison-
ment. A judge convicted Mr. Lewis on both counts and sentenced 
him to three years' probation.48 Mr. Lewis appealed the conviction, 
arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial had been vio-
lated because the aggregate penalty that the judge could have im-
posed following a conviction on both counts exceeded the six-
month Blanton standard.49 The Second Circuit rejected this argu-
ment and affirmed the conviction noting that, under the rule in 
Blanton, the right to jury trial depends upon indications from Con-
gress that the offense in question is serious. The court concluded 
that "[b]ecause Congress has given no indication that multiple of-
fenses are more serious by virtue of their multiplicity than are sin-
gle offenses of the same nature, the right to a jury trial cannot 
depend upon the maximum potential aggregate term of 
incarceration. "50 
Second, some courts argue that the aggregate of the maximum 
penalties for all joined offenses should be compared to the six-
month Blanton standard.51 This approach is called the "Aggregate 
45. See United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252,254-55 (2d Cir. 1995); City of Fort Lauderdale 
v. Byrd, 242 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); see also United States v. Coppins, 953 
F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); cf. Scott v. District of Columbia, 122 
A.2d 579,581 (D.C. 1956) (applying this approach to the right to jury trial under District of 
Columbia law); City of Monroe v. Wilhite, 233 So. 2d 535, 536 (La. 1970) (same under Louisi-
ana law); State v. James, 415 P.2d 543, 546 (N.M. 1966) (same under New Mexico law). 
46. Courts adopting the approaches described in this section use inconsistent terms - or 
no term at all -to describe their approaches. This Note adopts a uniform descriptive set of 
terms. In the case of the Individual Penalty Approach, no court has named this method of 
applying the Blanton standard. 
47. 65 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 1995). 
· 48. See 65 F.3d at 253. Although the Second Circuit adopted the Individual Penalty Ap-
proach knowing that Mr. Lewis had been sentenced to probation, the approach also has been 
adopted where the defendant was sentenced to a fine, see Wilhite, 233 So. 2d at 535, and 
where the sentence was not yet determined, see Byrd, 242 So. 2d at 494. 
No court has applied the Individual Penalty Approach to deny a defendant the right to 
jury trial and then sentenced that defendant to more than six months' imprisonment. Such 
an outcome, however, would be consistent with the approach. 
49. See Lewis, 65 F.3d at 253 • 
. . 50. 65 F.3d at 253; see also United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(Nirqteyer, J., dissenting) ("This is the case where multiple zeros still add up to zero."). 
51. See Coppins, 953 F.2d at 89-90; United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 382-83 (10th 
Cir. 1973), modified, Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547 (lOth Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Musgrave, 695 F. Supp. 231, 233 (W.D. Va. 1988); United States v. Coleman, 664 F. Supp. 
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Penalty Apptoach."52 The Fourth Circuit adopted this approach in 
United States v. Coppins. 53 Mildred Coppins was charged with sim-
ple assault, assault by beating, and trespassing - all in connection 
with a scuffle with police at the entrance of a military base. 
Although the three offenses carried a maximum aggregate penalty 
of 15 months' imprisonment, Ms. Coppins was denied a jury trial, 
convicted by a judge, and sentenced to pay a fine of $170. On ap-
peal, Ms. Coppins argued that the aggregate penalty, not each of-
fense individually, should have been compared to the six-month 
Blanton standard to determine whether she was entitled to jury 
trial. The Fourth Circuit agreed, remanding the case for a jury trial 
notwithstanding the fact that the sentence actually imposed - a 
$170 fine - implied that the trial judge regarded the set of offenses 
as petty. 
Third, some courts argue that no Sixth Amendment right to jury 
trial exists unless the sentence eventually imposed on the defendant 
exceeds the six-month Blanton standard.S4 This approach is called 
the "Sentence Imposed Approach."55 The Ninth Circuit adopted 
this approach in Rife v. Godbehere. 56 William Rife was charged 
with three counts of a misdemeanor punishable by up to six 
months' imprisonment.57 After denying Mr. Rife's motion for jury 
trial, the trial judge convicted Mr. Rife on all three counts and sen-
tenced him to one year in prison.ss Mr. Rife appealed the convic-
548, 549 (D.D.C. 1985); United States v. O'Connor, 660 F. Supp. 955, 956 (N.D. Ga. 1987); 
see also United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1522 (lOth Cir. 1991} (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
52. This approach also has been called the "objective approach." See Bencheck, 926 F.2d 
at 1517; Haar, 708 F.2d at 1553. 
53. 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991). 
54. See Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1512; Rife, 814 F.2d at 563; Haar, 708 F.2d at 1547; Bruce v. 
State, 614 P.2d 813 (Ariz. 1980); see also Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(adopting the Sentence Imposed Approach for multiple criminal contempts where each 
count has a maximum statutory penalty of six months' imprisonment). 
55. This approach also has been called the "subjective approach." See Bencheck, 926 
F.2d at 1518; Haar, 708 F.24 at 1553. 
56. 814 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987). Although this case predates the Blanton decision, it 
came after the six-month ceiling on petty offenses was announced in Baldwin v. New York, 
399 U.S. 66 (1970). Since Blanton effectively expanded the scope of petty offenses, there is 
no reason to think that the outcome in Rife would be different today. For a post-Blanton 
decision adopting the Sentence Imposed Approach, see Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1512. 
57. See Rife, 814 F.2d at 564. Rife was charged with unlawful use of the telephone to 
terrify, intimidate, threaten, annoy, or harass, which is a class-one misdemeanor. See Aruz. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2916 (1989). Class-one misdemeanors are punishable by up to si~ 
months' imprisonment. See Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-707 (1989). ' 
58. The initial sentence also included six years' probation and a $3,000 fine. See Rife~814 
F.2d at 564. Although Rife's initial sentence was "serious" under the Blanton standard, ot}Jer 
cases adopting the Sentence Imposed Approach have involved restrictions or putative restric-
tions on the sentencing discretion of the trial judge. ·· ' 
Haar was the first case to adopt the Sentence Imposed Approach for statutory offe,hse·s. 
Stephen Haar was convicted of two petty offenses in a magistrate proceeding and sentenced 
to six months in prison. On trial de novo, the district court denied Mr. Haar's request for a 
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tion twice and eventually his sentence was reduced to six months. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial 
judge may have violated Mr. Rife's Sixth Amendment right to jury 
trial by sentencing him to more than six months but that this viola-
tion was remedied when the sentence was reduced on appeal.59 
This Part compares the reasoning behind each of these judicial 
approaches to Supreme Court doctrine regarding the petty-offense 
exception explored in Part I. Section ll.A argues that the Individ-
ual Penalty Approach is consistent with Supreme Court principles. 
Section II.B argues that the Aggregate Penalty Approach conflicts 
with the principle that community preferences determine whether a 
criminal charge is petty or serious. Section II.C argues that the Sen-
tence Imposed Approach is contrary to the rule that the statutory 
penalty set by the legislature is the best indication of community 
preferences. 
A. The Individual Penalty Approach 
The Individual Penalty Approach is consistent with both the 
principle that community preferences determine the seriousness of 
an offense or set of offenses6o and the rule that the maximum pen-
alty set by the legislature is the best indicator of community prefer-
ences.61 Courts adopting this approach apply the six-month 
Blanton standard to each offense charged, regardless of whether an 
offense is joined with other offenses. The result is that a defendant 
charged with multiple offenses has a right to jury trial only if at least 
one of the offenses charged is punishable by more than six months' 
imprisonment. Because the Individual Penalty Approach is a literal 
jury trial because, pursuant to a local court rule, the court could not impose a sentence 
greater than that previously imposed by the magistrate. Owing to this procedural quirk, Mr. 
Haar faced a sentence of no greater than six months' imprisonment. The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed Mr. Haar's non jury conviction, holding that "a defendant is entitled to a jury trial for 
multiple petty offenses ... only if he is actually threatened at the commencement of trial with 
an aggregate potential penalty of greater than six months' imprisonment." Haar, 708 F.2d at 
1553. 
Bencheck is another example of the Sentence Imposed Approach. Kevin Bencheck was 
charged with several offenses - each having a maximum penalty of six months' imprison-
ment- stemming from a traffic stop near a military base. The judge denied Mr. Bencheck's 
motion for jury trial, promising him that under no circumstances would he be sentenced to 
more than six months in prison. After convicting Mr. Bencheck on four offenses, the judge 
sentenced him to a total of 10 days in jail. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding 
that denial of the right to jury trial is "not repugnant to the United States Constitution" as 
long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the six-month Blanton standard. Bencheck, 
926 F.2d at 1520. 
'59. See Rife, 814 F.2d at 565. In effect, the court held that as long as the sentence eventu-
ally imposed does not exceed six months' imprisonment, a trial judge is free to deny a motion 
for' jury trial. If the sentence imposed following a bench trial exceeds six months, then the 
defendant is entitled to a sentence reduction or a new trial before a jury. See supra note 36. 
· ' 60~ See supra section I.A. 
61. See supra section I.B. 
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application of the Blanton rule for nonjoined offenses, it is facially 
consistent with the principles of petty-offense-exception 
jurisprudence. 
Critics of the Individual Penalty Approach argue that it allows 
"serious" sentences to be imposed without triggering the right to 
jury trial. Defendants facing like consequences from criminal 
charges ought to be treated alike under the Sixth Amendment. For 
example, a defendant facing five years' imprisonment for multiple 
petty offenses should have the same right to jury trial as one facing 
five years' imprisonment for a single offense. 
Though intuitively appealing, this argument's focus on the con-
sequences to the defendant contradicts the fundamental principle 
that the right to jury trial must be allocated according to community 
preferences. This principle implies that the right to jury trial should 
not be allocated according to the consequences facing individual 
defendants.62 For this reason, the Supreme Court has noted repeat-
edly that the consequences to individual defendants should not con-
trol the right to jury trial.63 
The argument that "serious" penalties alone should trigger the 
right to jury trial also ignores the fact that, under any rule for multi-
ple offenses, the rule in Blanton allows "serious" penalties to accrue 
without triggering the right to jury trial. For example, suppose that 
a defendant convicted of a petty offense and sentenced to six 
months in prison commits a second petty offense while incarcer-
ated.64 In the trial on the second offense,65 the defendant could not 
assert the right to jury trial based on the fact that he is already in 
prison because the rule in Blanton forecloses the possibility of look-
ing beyond the maximum penalty of the offense charged.66 If the 
defendant is convicted on the second charge and sentenced to an 
62. See supra section I.A. 
63. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) ("[W)e plainly cannot accept 
petitioners' argument that a contemnor is entitled to a jury trial simply because a strong 
possibility exists that he will face a substantial term of imprisonment upon conviction •••• "); 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) ("[T]he possible consequences to defendants 
from convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to 
efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial administration resulting from the availability 
of speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications."). This conclusion also is implicit in the 
oft-repeated statement that objective measures of seriousness must be preferred over subjec· 
tive ones. See supra note 43. 
64. Incarceration is not essential to the example. Under the same logic used in this exam-
ple, the defendant might commit the second offense soon after being released or even many 
years later. Regardless of the total amount of time involved, the defendant will still serve a 
total of a year in prison based on two petty offenses. 
65. Of course, the two offenses cannot be joined for trial because the defendant already 
has been convicted of the first offense. But this is not a necessary ingredient of the example. 
"Serious" penalties also could result where a prosecutor declines to join two alleged offenses, 
and the defendant has no statutory right to joinder. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91. 
66. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) ("A defendant is 
entitled to a jury trial ... only if he can demonstrate that .•. statutory penalties .•. are so 
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additional six months behind bars, he will spend a total of a year in 
prison - a "serious" penalty - for committing two petty of-
fenses.67 Because the Blanton rule itself creates the possibility of a 
"serious" penalty resulting from multiple petty offenses, the possi-
bility of a "serious" penalty alone cannot be sufficient to trigger the 
right to jury trial.68 
Critics of the Individual Penalty Approach also argue that it 
fails to reflect community preferences in situations where a set of 
related offenses is regarded as more serious than the same set of 
unrelated offenses. The classic example of this situation is felony 
murder. Causing an accidental death during the course of commit-
ting a felony is far more serious in the eyes of society than causing 
an accidental death and committing a felony on two different occa-
sions.69 The same phenomenon exists in the context of petty of-
fenses. For example, speeding through a red light likely would be 
regarded by society as more serious than speeding and running a 
red light on two different occasions. Critics argue that the Individ-
ual Penalty Approach fails to account for this difference in commu-
nity preferences. Therefore, the approach does not trigger the right 
to jury trial for some sets of offenses regarded as serious by society. 
But this argument overlooks the fact that legislatures do ac-
count for some situations where sets of related offenses are more 
serious than sets of offenses committed in isolation by defining in-
dependent offenses that incorporate sets of lesser offenses. The fel-
ony murder rule is the perfect example. Because society believes 
that causing a death during the commission of a felony is more seri-
ous than causing death and committing a felony on two different 
occasions, legislatures have passed .laws authorizing an enhanced 
severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a 
'serious' one."). 
67. In theory, there is no limit to the amount of time a defendant could spend in prison-
without the benefit of a jury trial - based solely on the commission of petty offenses. 
68. The Individual Penalty Approach affects only the right to jury trial under Article III 
and the Sixth Amendment and therefore is compatible with due process limits on prison 
sentences that may be imposed without a jury trial. It would be an odd argument, of course, 
to claim that due process requires a broader right to trial by jury than the explicit guarantee 
contained in the Sixth Amendment. 
This approach also has no impact on the right to jury trial under state constitutions or 
under federal or state statutes. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent a legislature from passing 
a statute enhancing the maximum penalty for multiple petty offenses in order to trigger this 
right under Blanton. Cf. United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252,255 (2d Cir. 1995) (arguing that 
18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994), which states the general rule in federal sentencing that 
"[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently," implies that 
Congress views multiple offenses as no more serious than a single offense). For these rea-
sons, critics of this approach may be mollified by the fact that limits may be placed on "seri-
ous" consequences flowing from petty offenses without doing violence to settled petty-
offense-exception jurisprudence. 
69. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5 (2d 
ed. 1986 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the history and application of the felony murder rule). 
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penalty for this combination of offenses.7o By the same token, leg-
islatures have passed laws against reckless driving which may be 
invoked to impose an enhanced penalty against a driver, such as 
one who speeds through a red light egregiously violating the rules 
of the road.71 Thus, the objection that the Individual Penalty Ap-
proach does not account directly for community preferences con-
cerning certain sets of related offenses is tempered by the fact that 
legislatures indirectly account for such situations by creating new 
offenses with enhanced penalties.n 
The fact that legislatures define some serious crimes so that they 
include sets of petty offenses raises yet another concern. Critics ar-
gue that the Individual Penalty Approach offers a new opportunity 
for prosecutorial abuse by allowing a serious crime to be broken 
down into a set of petty offenses for the purpose of imposing a "se-
rious" sentence without triggering the right to jury trial. For exam-
ple, a person suspected of punching a victim five times with the 
intent of inflicting grievous bodily injury may be charged with one 
count of aggravated assault, a serious offense, or with five counts of 
simple assault, a petty offense. Under the Individual Penalty Ap-
proach, the prosecutor can dictate the suspect's Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial through the exercise of his charging discretion. By 
charging a set of petty offenses instead of a single serious offense, 
the prosecutor effectively can eliminate the defendant's right to jury 
trial.73 
Although the charging discretion of the prosecutor is always 
susceptible to abuse, the risk that a suspect in fact will receive an 
unjust "serious" penalty based on multiple petty offenses is limited. 
A bench trial does not imply an unfair trial.74 In order for a prose-
cutor to succeed in imposing a "serious" penalty for petty offenses, 
the trial judge must cooperate with the prosecutor's efforts. Only if 
the judge convicts the defendant on enough counts, imposes long 
enough sentences for each offense, and orders the sentences to be 
70. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994) (including felony murder in the definition of first-
degree murder). 
71. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1212 (McKinney Supp. 1995). 
72. See United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991) (Niemeyer, J., dissent-
ing) ("Only when one charge is elevated in seriousness by the existence of the other, such as 
under a recidivism statute, would multiple charging cause the elevation of the seriousness of 
a single offense. And in those cases, the statutorily enhanced sentence resolves the analysis." 
(citation omitted)). 
73. This scenario could give rise to the ironic defense of vindictive nonprosecution. Cf. 2 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PRocEDURE§ 13.5(a) (1984 & Supp. 
1991) (discussing the defense of vindictive prosecution). 
74. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) ("We would not assert, however, 
that every criminal trial - or any particular trial - held before a judge alone is unfair or 
that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury."). 
Indeed, some argue that nonjury trials may be fairer than jury trials. Cf. 391 U.S. at 188-89 
{Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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served consecutively will the prosecutor accomplish his goal of im-
posing a "serious" sentence based on multiple petty offenses. As a 
result, the risk of negative consequences to the defendant arising 
from this variant of prosecutorial abuse is probably small. 
B. Aggregate Penalty Approach 
The Aggregate Penalty Approach contradicts the principle that 
community preferences determine whether a criminal offense is 
petty or serious.75 This approach triggers the right to jury trial 
whenever the aggregate penalty for a set of joined, petty offenses 
exceeds the six-month Blanton standard. Although courts adopting 
this approach pay lip service to the importance of community pref-
erences,76 they do not suggest any reasonable basis for concluding 
that the aggregate penalty is related to community preferences con-
cerning the set of offenses. Without some link between the aggre-
gate penalty and community preferences, the Aggregate Penalty 
Approach cannot be squared with petty-offense-exception 
jurisprudence. 
For individual offenses, a logical connection exists between com-
munity preferences and the allocation of the right to jury trial. 
When a legislature sets the maximum penalty for a statutory of-
fense, it includes within that penalty an assessment of community 
preferences concerning the offense.77 Because legislators are con-
stantly in touch with their constituents, and legislators can modify 
statutory penalties whenever public sentiment shifts,78 courts rea-
sonably can assume that the maximum statutory penalty accurately 
reflects community preferences. The reasonableness of the six-
month Blanton standard depends on this logical connection.79 
Without a direct correlation between legislative action and commu-
nity preferences, the Blanton standard would be senseless - allo-
cating the right to jury trial solely on the basis of legislative whim. 
When statutory penalties are aggregated, the cause-and-effect 
relationship between community preferences and the maximum 
penalty disappears. No advocate of the Aggregate Penalty Ap-
proach has argued that legislatures in fact consider the various ways 
in which penalties might be aggregated when setting the maximum 
penalty for particular offenses. But, unless legislatures do assign 
maximum penalties with aggregation in mind, the crucial link con-
75. See supra section I.A (discussing community preferences). 
76. See Coppir.s, 953 F.2d at 89; United States v. O'Connor, 660 F. Supp. 955, 956 (N.D. 
Ga. 1987). 
77. See supra note 26. 
78. See supra note 25. 
79. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989). 
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necting community preferences to the maximum penalty is absent.80 
For this reason, courts adopting the Aggregate Penalty Approach 
run the risk of allocating the right to jury trial without reference to 
community preferences. 
Even if aggregate penalties are not connected directly to com-
munity preferences through the legislature, advocates of the Aggre-
gate Penalty Approach still argue that aggregation provides the 
best estimate available of community preferences concerning sets of 
petty offenses.s1 If a set of petty offenses, considered as a whole, 
generally is more serious than any one of the offenses making up 
the set,82 the Aggregate Penalty Approach, though imperfect, may 
be the best available method for estimating the difference between 
the seriousness of an individual petty offense and the seriousness of 
a set of petty offenses. 
The problem with this "best estimate" argument is that the Ag-
gregate Penalty Approach does not trigger the right to jury trial for 
all sets of offenses that have an aggregate penalty exceeding six 
months but only those sets that have been joined for trial. The ag-
gregate penalty for a particular set of offenses is the same regard-
less of whether the constituent offenses have been joined. 
Therefore, if this approach is justified by its ability to gauge public 
sentiment regarding a set of offenses, then joined and nonjoined 
offenses should be treated alike. But joined and non joined offenses 
80. Even if a legislature did construct a scheme of maximum penalties designed to be 
aggregated by the courts - an enormously difficult endeavor given the possibility that any 
offense may be joined with any other offense - the question of whether such an artificial 
scheme actually reflects community preferences would remain. There is no reason to assume 
that community preferences aggregate as easily as maximum terms of imprisonment. 
81. Thus far, only one court has cast the argument in terms of estimating community 
preferences. See Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1552 (lOth Cir. 1983) ("The aggregate of 
the statutorily prescribed penalties provides the objective indicia of the opprobrium that soci· 
ety attaches to the entire criminal act and is thus the appropriate measure of the act's serious· 
ness."). That court, however, rejected the Aggregate Penalty Approach in favor of the 
Sentence Imposed Approach. See 708 F.2d at 1553. Courts that have adopted the Aggregate 
Penalty Approach usually justify it by arguing that potential consequences to the defendant 
are "serious" whenever the aggregate penalty exceeds six months. See, e.g., United States v. 
Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 382 (lOth Cir. 1973) ("We believe that the defendants can view as no 
less serious a possible penalty of a year in prison when charged with two offenses arising out 
of the same act, transaction, or occurrence, than if charged with one offense having a poten-
tial penalty of one year's imprisonment."). This justification, however, plainly contradicts the 
principle that consequences to the defendant should not determine whether an offense is 
petty or serious. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19. 
82. No advocate of this approach explicitly argues that society always regards a set of 
offenses as more serious than the sum of the individual constituent offenses. Indeed, such a 
proposition would be difficult to establish. For example, society's judgment concerning two 
parking violations is probably identical to its judgment concerning one parking violation. See 
United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Congress has not indicated that 
multiple offenses for which a defendant is prosecuted jointly are necessarily any more serious 
in their aggregate than the most serious individual offense."). For this reason, it is a common 
practice for courts to impose concurrent sentences, especially in the petty offense context. 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994). 
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must be treated differently because, under Blanton, a set of non-
joined offenses may not trigger the right to jury trial even if the 
aggregate penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment.83 
In response to this problem, advocates of the Aggregate Penalty 
Approach could argue that society considers joined sets of offenses 
to be more serious than nonjoined sets of offenses. But there is no 
reason to believe that community preferences are related to the de-
cision to join offenses.84 Joinder is simply a procedural device 
designed to promote efficiency in the courts.ss Community prefer-
ences concerning a set of offenses are not related to the decision to 
join those offenses for trial.s6 The prosecutor's decision to join of-
fenses for trial is normally influenced only by concerns about effi-
ciency in the presentation of evidence and fairness to the 
defendant.87 
The arbitrary distinction between joined and nonjoined offenses 
under the Aggregate Penalty Approach also creates a perverse in-
centive for prosecutors to refuse to join offenses in order to avoid 
expensive jury trials.ss Joinder of offenses may be desirable for the 
defendant as well as the prosecutor.s9 But if joinder itself creates 
expensive procedural rights - as it does under the Aggregate Pen-
83. See, e.g., Lewis, 65 F.3d at 255 (noting, in a case with multiple petty offenses that the 
Government could have tried separately, that the defendant himself "admit[ ted] that under 
such a circumstance he would not have been entitled to a jury trial"). 
84. See 65 F.3d at 255 ("The mere fact that the government chose to consolidate the 
charges provides no greater justification for a jury trial than if the charges were tried 
separately."). 
85. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Byrd, 242 So. 2d 494, 497 {Fla. Dist. a. App. 1970) 
{"The joinder of offenses for purposes of trial is a procedural device designed to promote 
efficiency and convenience and has nothing to do with the nature of the individual offense as 
serious or petty."); State v. James, 415 P .2d 543, 546 (N.M. 1966) ("The consolidation of the 
petty offenses for trial does not change their nature, nor can they when combined be classed 
as a felony."), overruled by State v. Sanchez, 786 P.2d 42, 46 (N.M. 1990); see also United 
States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86,91 {4th Cir.1991) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("Simply because 
the offenses were tried together or on one charging document is, in my judgment, irrelevant 
to the constitutional inquiry."); 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 73, § 17.1(a). 
86. Even if prosecutors did attempt to estimate community preferences when deciding 
whether to join offenses, such subjective speculation has been proscribed specifically by the 
Supreme Court. In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 {1988), the Supreme 
Court stated that "the judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that 
of a legislature." 489 U.S. at 541. Arguably, the same admonition applies to members of the 
executive branch. After all, individual prosecutors have no better insight into community 
preferences than individual judges. Therefore, attempts by a prosecutor to account for com-
munity preferences when deciding whether to join offenses probably would not be regarded 
by the Supreme Court as objective indications of seriousness. Cf. 489 U.S. at 541 {"In recent 
years, however, we have sought more 'objective indications of the seriousness with which 
society regards the offense.' "). 
87. See 2 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 73, § 17.1(a), at 354. 
88. The prosecutor always has discretion, as an initial matter, to refuse to join related 
offenses. See 2 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 73, § 17.3{a). The court may choose to consol-
idate related indictments or informations sua sponte. See 2 id. Note that private parties have 
no authority to force the prosecutor to charge offenses all at once. See 2 id. § 13.3(a). 
89. Professors LaFave and Israel describe the advantages of joinder as follows: 
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alty Approach - prosecutors will avoid joining offenses and, in-
stead, charge each offense in a separate indictment or 
information.9° This result is the worst of all possible worlds for the 
defendant, who is both denied the right to jury trial for the set of 
offenses and denied the advantages of a single trial for all related 
charges. 
C. Sentence Imposed Approach 
The Sentence Imposed Approach contradicts the rule that the 
maximum penalty set by the legislature is the best indication of 
community preferences. In sentencing a person convicted of multi-
ple offenses, a judge does provide an indication of community pref-
erences concerning the set of offenses charged. The Supreme Court 
has deferred to this subjective judgment where the crime is criminal 
contempt because no statutory indication of community prefer-
ences exists for that offense. But for offenses carrying a maximum 
statutory penalty, the Supreme Court consistently has held that the 
legislature's estimation of community preferences must be pre-
ferred to that of the judiciary.9t 
Advocates of the Sentence Imposed Approach argue that the 
rule in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania92 should control in cases where 
multiple petty offenses are joined for trial.93 In Codispoti, the 
Supreme Court considered the question of whether multiple crimi-
nal contempts, arising out of a single trial, trigger the Sixth Amend-
The provisions permitting joinder of related offenses have generally been favorably 
viewed by commentators, for such joinder may have substantial advantages for both the 
prosecution and the defendant: "The joint trial of offenses that share common factual 
circumstances enables the state to avoid the duplication of evidence required by sepa-
rate trials, to reduce the inconvenience to victims and witnesses, to minimize the time 
required to dispose of the offenses • . • . A single trial will eliminate the harassment, 
trauma, expense, and prolonged publicity of multiple trials. A single trial may result in a 
faster disposition of all cases, may increase the possibility of concurrent sentences in the 
event of conviction, and may prevent the application of enhanced sentencing statutes." 
2 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 73, § 17.1(a) (quoting 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR C!uMINAL 
JUSTICE § 13·2.1 cmt. (2d ed. 1980)). 
90. See United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Moreover, the question 
of Lewis's right to a jury trial could have been obviated altogether had the government cho· 
sen to simply charge both counts of obstructing the mail in separate informations."); United 
States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("If each petty 
offense were charged in a separate charging document and tried separately, the defendant 
would be tried by the court each time, even if the sentences on each were imposed 
consecutively."). 
91. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989); District of Co-
lumbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937). 
92. 418 u.s. 506 (1974). 
93. See United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 {lOth Cir. 1991); Rife v. 
Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1987). But see Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 
1550 n.14 (lOth Cir. 1983) (stating that Codispoti has "limited precedential value ..• because 
of the unusual nature of criminal contempt charges"). 
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ment right to jury trial.94 Dominick Codispoti acted as his own 
counsel in a criminal trial that resulted in a conviction. During the 
course of the trial, he was charged with seven counts of criminal 
contempt. Mr. Codispoti's motion for a jury trial was denied, and 
he eventually was convicted of all seven counts of criminal con-
tempt.95 Although Mr. Codispoti was not sentenced to more than 
six months for any single contempt charge, his sentence aggregated 
to more than three years in prison.96 The Supreme Court rejected 
the contention that each count of criminal contempt was a separate 
petty offense97 and held that the rule in Bloom v. Illinois9B controls 
where multiple charges of criminal contempt arise out of a single 
trial.99 Thus, Mr. Codispoti improperly was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial because the sentence imposed ex-
ceeded six months in prison. 
Advocates of the Sentence Imposed Approach argue that, 
although the maximum penalty fixed by the legislature provides a 
clear, objective indication of community preferences for individual 
offenses, no legislative indication of community preferences exists 
for sets of offenses. Therefore, multiple petty offenses are analo-
gous to multiple criminal contempts, and, following Codispoti, the 
sentence imposed by the judge provides the best indication of com-
munity preferences. 
This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that legislatures do 
identify "serious" sets of petty offenses by defining crimes with en-
hanced statutory penalties that incorporate multiple petty of-
fenses.100 By defining serious crimes that may be charged in lieu of 
sets of petty offenses, legislatures provide an objective indication of 
community preferences regarding certain sets of petty offenses. 
94. Codispoti is the only Supreme Court case addressing the problem of applying the 
petty-offense exception to multiple offenses joined for trial. 
95. See Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 507-09. Initially, Mr. Codispoti was convicted summarily 
on all seven counts by the judge that presided over his criminal case and received a sentence 
of 7-14 years in prison. Although the convictions were affirmed by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 
U.S. 455 (1971), and remanded the case for retrial before a different judge. It was only at this 
point that Mr. Codispoti had the opportunity to request a jury trial. See 418 U.S. at 507-08. 
96. See 418 U.S. at 509. 
97. See 418 U.S. at 517 ("We find unavailing respondent's contrary argument that [Mr. 
Codispoti's] contempts were separate offenses and that, because no more than a six months' 
sentence was imposed for any single offense, each contempt was necessarily a petty offense 
triable without a jury."). 
98. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Bloom was the first case to recognize that criminal contempts 
trigger the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. The rule in Bloom is that, where no maxi-
mum statutory penalty exists for an offense, the sentence imposed determines whether an 
offense is petty or serious. For a discussion of Bloom, see supra section I. C. 
99. See Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 517 ("In terms of the sentence imposed, which was obvi-
ously several times more than six months, [Mr. Codispoti] was tried for what was equivalent 
to a serious offense and was entitled to a jury trial."). 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72. 
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Some sets of petty offenses are "serious," and they may be charged 
as a single serious offense.101 Other sets of petty offenses can be 
charged only as multiple petty offenses. Since legislatures do re-
spond to community preferences in some cases by fashioning "seri-
ous" penalties for multiple petty offenses, courts should assume 
that legislatures also are responding to community preferences 
when they decline to create "serious" penalties for other sets of 
petty offenses. 
Even if legislatures did not provide enhanced penalties for "seri-
ous" sets of petty offenses, the rule in Codispoti would be inappo-
site for multiple statutory offenses because some indication of 
community preferences exists in the maximum penalty for each of-
fense. The rule for criminal contempts in Bloom, which was 
adopted in Codispoti, applies only to criminal contempts where no 
statutory penalty exists.102 In cases where a statutory penalty does 
exist, the Supreme Court uniformly has held that the sentence im-
posed is irrelevant as a measure of community preferences.lo3 Ap-
plying the rule in Codispoti to multiple statutory offenses, 
therefore, ignores the Supreme Court's repeated admonition to 
avoid substituting the judicial measures of community preferences 
for those of the legislature.104 
Advocates of the Sentence Imposed Approach also argue that it 
protects defendants from overzealous prosecution by ensuring that 
sentences exceeding six months in prison are not imposed without a 
jury tria1.10s The overarching purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial is to protect defendants against oppression by the 
government.1°6 The Sentence Imposed Approach bows to this fun-
damental principle by providing this right whenever a "serious" 
penalty is imposed. 
Reliance on the purpose behind the right to jury trial, however, 
ignores the necessity of drawing a reasonable line - firmly 
grounded in the principles underlying the petty-offense exception 
101. For example, legislatures could define a single serious offense that would encompass 
all multiple petty offenses, such as by creating a recidivist statute. 
102. See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 219-20 {1968). 
103. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 
149 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 n.35 (1968). 
104. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989); District of 
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937). 
105. See United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1519 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("[T]here is a 
need for interposing the common sense judgment of a jury between the government and the 
defendant .... "); Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1552 (lOth Cir. 1983) ("The approach 
thus protects the defendant from vindictive prosecution, interposing the jury between the 
government and the defendant in all cases where there is a risk of serious punishment and a 
consequent possibility of prosecutorial abuse."). 
106. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56. 
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- between offenses that trigger the right and those that do not.107 
Nobody can deny that the right to jury trial is a procedural safe-
guard designed to benefit defendants. But the need to exempt the 
least serious offenses from a blanket right to jury trial is equally 
well-established.1os Deference to the overarching purpose of this 
right would imply that the petty-offense exception always should be 
construed narrowly. The Supreme Court, however, specifically has 
repudiated this view by repeatedly declining invitations to restrict 
application of the petty-offense exception.1°9 Because the purpose 
behind the right to jury trial - the desire to provide a procedural 
safeguard to criminal defendants - stands fundamentally opposed 
to the existence of a petty-offense exception, it provides little gui-
dance to courts seeking to draw lines defining the scope of that 
exception. 
Underlying both of these arguments in favor of the Sentence 
Imposed Approach is the common-sense idea that multiple petty 
offenses and single serious offenses should be treated alike under 
the Sixth Amendment because, from the defendant's point of view, 
it makes no difference whether a lengthy sentence results from one 
offense or multiple offenses.110 This notion, however, contradicts 
the fundamental principle that community preferences determine 
whether a criminal offense is petty or serious and its corollary, that 
the consequences to the defendant should not determine the seri-
ousness of a criminal offense.l11 Although it may seem reasonable 
to treat defendants facing identical sentences alike under the Sixth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that the 
107. See 391 U.S. at 160-61 ("[I]t is necessary to draw a line in the spectrum of crime, 
separating petty from serious infractions. This process, although essential, cannot be wholly 
satisfactory, for it requires attaching different consequences to events which, when they lie 
near the line, actually differ very little."). 
108. See supra notes 3, 5. 
109. See United States v. Nachtigal, 113 S. a. 1072, 1074 (1993) (denying the right to jury 
trial even though the maximum penalty for the offense in question was set by the Secretary of 
the Interior); Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538,543 (1989) (denying the right 
to jury trial even though mandatory penalties other than the maximum period of incarcera-
tion could have been considered "serious"); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974) 
(denying the right to jury trial even though the defendant initially was sentenced to more 
than four years in prison); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147,148 (1969) (denying the right 
to jury trial even though the defendant was sentenced to three years' probation); District of 
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617,625-26 (1937) (denying the right to jury trial even though 
the defendant was sentenced to 90 days in prison). 
110. See United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1518 (lOth Cir. 1991). Justice White 
made an analogous observation when arguing that all individual offenses having a statutory 
penalty of greater than six months' imprisonment necessarily trigger the Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial. See United States v. Baldwin, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) ("One who is 
threatened with the possibility of imprisonment for six months may find little difference be-
tween the potential consequences that face him, and the consequences that faced appellant 
here."). 
111. See supra section I.A. 
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scarce right to jury trial cannot be allocated according to the 
mercurial concerns of individual defendants.112 
CONCLUSION 
The petty-offense exception is something of an anomaly in Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence. It is justified by the practical need for 
the efficient allocation of scarce judicial resources, at the expense of 
the democratic ideals which counsel broad application of the right 
to jury trial. Because the petty-offense exception runs counter to 
democratic instincts, it is particularly important that it be applied in 
a reasoned manner. 
Efficient allocation of the right to jury trial requires courts to 
assess community preferences concerning an offense or set of of-
fenses in order to determine whether this right attaches for a given 
defendant. Of the three approaches for allocating the right to jury 
trial to defendants accused of multiple offenses, only the Individual 
Penalty Approach gives due regard to community preferences. The 
other approaches extend the right to a jury to cases where the legis-
lature has expressed the community's unwillingness to endure the 
expense that a jury trial entails. These approaches. thus ignore the 
Supreme Court's command that courts heed community prefer-
ences regarding the seriousness of criminal offenses. Consequently, 
courts should adopt the Individual Penalty Approach so that scarce 
judicial resources are not wasted. 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19. 
